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Abstract 
 
The EU Speakers’ Conference has experienced a ‘second youth’ after the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon by playing a ‘quasi-constitutional’ role in inter-parliamentary 
cooperation, and in particular by trying to exercise a rule-making function over the many 
inter-parliamentary venues of the EU’s system of government. The fulfilment of such a 
function has certainly not been made any easier as a consequence of the constitutional 
constraints surrounding the positions of the Speakers and Presidents of the European and 
Member States’ (MS) Parliaments, with a considerable variety in terms of powers and 
decision-making capacity among the MS and the EU. Despite these limitations, the ‘quasi-
constitutional’ role of the EU Speakers’ Conference has mainly consisted of approving 
guidelines, if not directly rules of procedure, for other inter-parliamentary venues. It has 
also been argued that the coordinating function of the EU Speakers’ Conference can be 
much more effective when looking at its ‘quasi-constitutional’ role, and also in its function 
of joint parliamentary scrutiny in the EU, if it is aimed at enhancing the rational 
organisation of inter-parliamentary activities in terms of timing, agendas and ex-post 
supervision of the results, in the absence of any other possible alternative to the Speakers’ 
leadership. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The EU Speakers’ Conference was the first inter-parliamentary conference to be set up 
in the EU back in 1975, when it started to meet every year on a regular basis. This 
conference, although lacking express acknowledgment in earlier EU Treaties and 
protocols,I has recently experienced a ‘second youth’ when, after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, new inter-parliamentary conferences were created (Hefftler and 
Gattermann 2015). Indeed, thanks to the support of most national parliaments, the EU 
Speakers’ Conference has taken up the function of coordinating inter-parliamentary 
activities and directing their development, right up to that of the approval of the rules of 
procedures of other inter-parliamentary conferences.  
The article aims to assess the current role of the EU Speakers’ Conference and its 
potential for leading inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU, which is currently 
developing without a clear rationale and has seen the growth of several inter-parliamentary 
venues with uncertain if not overlapping mandates and very little coordination. The article 
claims that, following the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Speakers’ Conference has taken up a 
‘quasi-constitutional role’: the activity of devising and defining, in most cases, the basic 
rules – i.e. the ‘Constitutions’ – under which the new inter-parliamentary conferences 
operate. This role can be fulfilled through the exercise of two main functions by the 
Speakers’ Conference, that of coordination of inter-parliamentary activities in the EU, 
which today is rather limited, and most of all that of ruling over the organisation and 
operation of inter-parliamentary venues, a function that has grown steadily so far.II Is this 
role of the Conference effective and desirable at all? This contribution questions the 
current ability of the EU Speakers’ Conference to lead an ordered and stable development 
of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU, thus casting doubts on its effectiveness. 
After having explored potential alternatives to the Speakers’ leadership, it concludes that 
the two Speakers’ Conference’s functions should be re-balanced. In other words, rather 
than focusing almost exclusively on its ‘rule-making’ capacity, the Conference should 
ground its ‘quasi-constitutional’ role on its coordinating function, to enhance the rational 
organisation of inter-parliamentary activities in terms of timing, agendas and ex-post 
supervision of the results. 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
86 
The article also considers the domestic powers of the Speakers and the asymmetric 
position of the European Parliament’s President. Here it is argued that the function 
performed by this conference is somewhat sui generis compared to other emergent inter-
parliamentary conferences and venues that are normally policy-oriented, follow cluster of 
interests or are geographically recognisable (Fromage 2016: 749-772). Indeed, the EU 
Speakers’ Conference is neither meant to fulfil a joint parliamentary scrutiny role on the 
EU’s fragmented executive (Curtin 2014: 1-32), i.e. a shared and collective scrutiny by the 
legislatures placed at the different levels of government (Cooper 2014: 2; Griglio 2016: 586-
587; Eppler and Maurer 2017: 242-243; Griglio and Lupo 2018: 358-373) nor to create a 
sort of ‘parallel’ parliamentary diplomacy in the EU.III Rather, it plays an overarching quasi-
constitutional role in that it tries to establish order in the complex and chaotic world of 
inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU by exercising both a coordinating function and a 
(sometimes questionable) ‘rule-making’ function (Fasone 2016: 269-289). In theory, this 
makes the EU Speakers’ Conference a prominent actor in the wider set of interinstitutional 
relations in the EU, although in practice this potential is not fully exploited due to the 
peculiar features of the Conference itself. 
It should be noted, in fact, that the very strength of this inter-parliamentary venue, 
namely its composition, is at the same time, a weakness. Indeed, while the Speakers of EU 
Parliaments and parliamentary chambers certainly hold the most important office within 
their own legislatures, they are characterised by very different powers across Member States 
and the European Parliament. Some Speakers must be impartial and, in theory, not 
affiliated to any political group: they cannot take a political stance nor vote; some others, 
instead, are a clear expression of the majority and tend to act in alliance with the 
Government. The first group of Speakers, when acting in the Speakers’ Conference and, 
more generally, in supranational and international venues, are not entitled to vote on behalf 
of, or bind, their parliaments. This can prove to be a limitation to the effectiveness of the 
EU Speakers’ Conference, which as it is dependent upon national provisions, is not easy to 
overcome.  
In contrast, the second group comprises Speakers that, despite being able to take a 
political stance in both EU and foreign affairs, nevertheless are unable to give voice to the 
pluralistic composition of their Parliament to also encompass the representation of 
opposition and minorities’ interests. At the same time the position of the President of the 
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European Parliament is side-lined compared to national Speakers. After an historical 
excursus of the activity of the Speakers’ Conference and a comparative analysis of the 
powers of the Speakers, the article offers an appraisal of the EU Speakers’ Conference 
activity with regards to the functions it performs, and its contribution to inter-
parliamentary cooperation. It evaluates what alternatives are available to fulfil the ‘quasi-
constitutional’ role of the EU Speakers’ Conference and concludes that, in their absence, it 
is more appropriate to strengthen the Conference’s coordinating function.  
 
2. History of  the Conference 
 
The first meeting of the EU Speakers’ Conference was organised in 1963 in Rome at 
the initiative of the then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European 
Community, Gaetano Martino, and aimed to gather together the parliaments of Europe at 
an apical level. More than 10 years elapsed before subsequent meetings were called in 
Strasbourg and Rome in 1975,IV as, in a few years, the European Parliament (still called 
Parliamentary Assembly at that time) was to become a directly elected Parliament. 
 In its first period (1975–79) the Conference met on an annual basis, but besides the 
President of the European Parliament, it also involved the Speakers of the Parliaments 
from all Member States of the Council of Europe, also including the President of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of this international organisation. Subsequently, from 1980 to 
1998, this enlarged format of the Conference, also called the ‘Big Conference’, alternated 
every two years with the ‘Small Conference’, which only comprised the President of the 
European Parliament and the Speakers of the national parliaments within the European 
Community. Hence every year either the ‘Small’ or the ‘Big’ Conference was convened. 
This peculiar arrangement made the Conference a sort of unique liaison at the 
parliamentary level between the two principal international-supranational organisations 
established in post-World War II Europe. 
After the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and, even more so after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam of 1997, the European Parliament and national parliaments were accorded a 
much more prominent ‘constitutional’ role at the European level than in the past. In 
consequence, the ‘Small Conference’ was transformed into an autonomous inter-
parliamentary forum regularly convened, at least on an annual basis. Furthermore, informal 
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and extraordinary meetings were organised, in particular on the occasion of celebrations, 
like the fortieth and sixtieth anniversaries of the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, or 
in the aftermath of Treaty revisions, to agree on common positions among the parliaments 
while intergovernmental conferences were taking place.V The latter instances, namely the 
extraordinary meetings of the EU Speakers’ Conference, convened while 
intergovernmental conferences on Treaty changes were in operation, possibly represent the 
only case of joint parliamentary scrutiny carried out by this Conference. 
The Speakers’ Conference was initially seen merely as a forum for discussion on topics 
such as parliaments and globalisation and the role of parliaments in the EU, and in the 
scrutiny of their executives. However, reforms of European Treaties, especially starting 
from the (failed) Constitutional Treaty of 2004, triggered the construction of a new 
‘institutional’ role for the EU Speakers’ Conference, oriented towards building the 
foundations of a coherent and coordinated development of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation in the EU under the Conference’s supervision. 
In 2004 the Speakers’ Conference adopted the Guidelines for Interparliamentary 
Cooperation in the European Union, subsequently amended in 2008, defining the aims, 
framework, fields and instruments of cooperation. These Guidelines are still observed 
today in respect of the relationship between the many inter-parliamentary bodies in the 
EU. However, they have not been updated to include the most recent, and significant, 
developments in inter-parliamentary cooperation, like the creation of the 
Interparliamentary Conferences on CFSP and CSDP (on Stability, Economic Coordination 
and Governance) and the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group (on Europol): these were not 
envisaged in the Guidelines, thereby making them only partially useful. 
On 15 May 2010 the EU Speakers’ Conference in Stockholm adopted the Guidelines 
for its activity, to date the ‘rules of procedure’ of the Conference. The Conference, 
composed of Speakers of national parliaments and the President of the European 
Parliament, acting on an equal basis, operates by consensus, with the assurance of the 
simultaneous translation into the EU official languages and the circulation of written texts 
in French and English only. The ‘rules of procedure’ reiterate the coordinating role of the 
Conference in EU inter-parliamentary cooperation. In addition to this, the mandate of the 
Conference is fairly limited, as a forum for the exchange of opinions, information and 
experiences, on parliamentary organisation and functions, and for fostering joint research 
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and common action. The Conference, even nowadays, only meets once a year, under the 
presidency of the Parliaments of the Member States holding the EU Presidency in the 
second half of the previous year, and in the absence of a permanent secretariat relies on the 
administrative support of the coordination of secretary generals. The Presidency is 
responsible for preparing the final draft agenda and the conclusions of the meeting with a 
view to reflecting the common position emerging in the Conference. Issues addressed in 
the conclusions can range from the Conference’s stance on the EU neighborhood policy 
and prospective accessions to the UK withdrawal from the EU and the development of 
EU military capabilities and of a defence capacity.VI These are viewed from a parliamentary 
perspective; namely, in terms of the contribution that parliaments can make on the issue at 
stake and, with this regard, the conclusions are formulated in terms of guidelines and 
directions. Speakers are allowed to express their own opinions and to make it clear that the 
conclusions were not accepted by the Conference as a whole:VII should dissenting positions 
emerge they can be made explicit in the conclusions, typically through footnotes.  
Ad hoc working groups, established on only a few occasions, can be set up to look 
after specific issues – for instance the quality of legislation. These only remain in operation 
for a limited, and pre-determined, period, so that these share no similarity to structured 
committee systems, with a specialisation by subject-matter, found in the EP and national 
parliaments. Thus, it is clear that the Conference is not a permanent body, i.e. it is not 
summoned or in session beyond its yearly meeting, nor does a permanent secretariat exist, 
and has limited decision-making capacity given the consensus rule, its internal organisation 
and the frequency of its meetings. 
 
3. Weaknesses (and strengths) of  the Conference’s composition 
 
Other limitations to the decision-making capacity of the Conference derive from EU 
and national constitutional law. Indeed, there are constitutional constraints that restrict 
what the Speakers and the European Parliament’s President can actually do. Those limits 
are fixed at the domestic level, and in principle cannot be overcome when they act in the 
Conference at the supranational level. In other words, the way these Speakers can perform 
their tasks in the EU is inevitably shaped by the institutional standing and power enjoyed in 
their respective constitutional systems (Longo 2014: 367-374). Indeed, this principle is 
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expressly acknowledged by the Conference’s Guidelines, in Article 1(2): ‘The activities of 
the Conference respect the autonomy and the constitutional position of each participating 
Speaker’. This provision is further emphasised in Article 2, where the objectives of the 
Conference are listed, and it is specified that their fulfilment cannot violate the different 
powers vested in its members. 
When looking at the constitutional status of the Speakers and the President, as 
anticipated in the introduction, two main models are used, that of Speakers actively 
involved in politics and in political decisions, like in France or Germany, and the Speakers 
who aspire to be neutral and independent from party affiliation, such as in the UK.  
In the two Houses of the French Parliament, for example, the Speakers are prominent 
politicians who are certainly expected to apply the rules of procedure and standing orders 
impartially, but undoubtedly pursue the interest of the majority and are allowed to vote 
without special restrictions (Martin 1996; Avril, Gicquel and Gicquel 2014: 70ff.).  
In Germany, the Speaker of the Bundestag traditionally is not a super partes actor either, 
and is typically elected amongst prominent politicians and former Ministers. Just to provide 
an example, the Speaker of the Bundestag elected in the 19th parliamentary term, started in 
2017, is Wolfgang Schäuble, the former powerful Minister of Finance of the German 
Federation. Less significant, from a political point of view, is the position of the President 
of the Bundesrat, in light of the intergovernmental composition of this Upper House 
where the executives of the Länder are represented and where each delegation casts a block 
vote, weighted according to the size of the Land’s population. According to the German 
Constitutional Tribunal, when presiding over a ballot the President of the Bundesrat can 
only try to bring about a clarification on the results of the vote and work towards making 
the vote effective, but has ‘no right to strive to achieve a uniform vote [in a delegation] by 
means of measures he took as chairperson of the session’.VIII Indeed, it cannot be denied 
that in bicameral legislatures, the case of 13 out of 28 of EU national parliaments, a further 
diversification may occur at the national level between the two Houses,IX where, in the light 
of their composition and powers, the two Speakers enjoy a different constitutional standing 
and autonomy. By contrast, the Speaker in the UK House of Commons is deemed to be an 
impartial arbiter of parliamentary proceedings, and cannot vote or take a stance in 
parliamentary and political debates in general – although sometimes the practice departs 
from this constitutional convention – and when running for the next Parliament the 
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election of the Speaker is (customarily) uncontested (with no other mainstream party 
fielding candidates) in her/his constituency (Torre 2000; Russell and Gover 2017: 151-152). 
In the Nordic countries the style of the parliamentary Speakership resembles the UK 
model much more than the French case (Iacometti 2001).  
However, it appears that in the EU most parliaments have turned towards the French-
German model of the politically active Speaker, as shown in most Eastern European 
countries and in Italy, possibly also as a consequence of their more frequent involvement in 
EU and foreign affairs, including the EU Speakers’ Conference. The case of the Italian 
Speakers confirms this trend, in particular in the last few years: although they do not 
usually vote in parliament, they have considerable political (constitutional) influence and 
are not expected to be super partes (Manzella 1997: 110; Ibrido 2015: 180-193). In Italy, a 
constitutional convention has gradually become established that provides for the Speakers 
of either House, but most likely of the Chamber of Deputies, to be elected from among 
opposition MPs (1976–92) and, more recently (1994–2018), from among MPs elected 
within the second ranking party of the winning majority coalition, while the President of 
the Senate comes from the main ruling party of the governmental coalition.X In other 
words, the Italian Speaker’s political role has definitely increased (Lupo 2010; 
Gianfrancesco, Lupo and Rivosecchi (eds) 2014) up to the point that towards the end of 
the 17th parliamentary term (2013-2018), the then Speaker of the Senate, Pietro Grasso, left 
the group and the party on whose lists he had been elected and announced the creation of 
a new political party, ‘Liberi e Uguali’, that would campaign for the next political election 
under his leadership and with the Speaker of the other House, the Chamber of Deputies, 
Laura Boldrini, joining the same party as a candidate.  
In the EU, the President of the European Parliament, whose mandate lasts only half of 
the parliamentary term – hence two and a half years – is usually elected based on a political 
compromise between the two major European political groups, the socialists (S&D) and 
those of the people’s party (PPE), depending on the context, with or without the support 
of the liberals (ALDE). While the President enjoys great visibility outside the European 
Parliament in the relationship with the other EU institutions and the media, inside the 
Parliament his role is rather weak and is overlooked by the decisions of political groups and 
the Conference of Groups’ Chairpersons (Costa 2013: 143-162; Gianniti and Lupo 2016: 
144-160).  
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The ability of parliamentary delegations to bind their own parliaments, through the 
position they adopt within inter-parliamentary conferences, is always problematic, 
according to whether a prior ‘mandate’ has been voted by the parliament to direct the 
delegation (which happens in few cases) or not. Normally, this ‘mandate’ could by no 
means be equated to that approved in some parliaments, like the Danish Folketing, 
towards their governments – i.e. there are no real accountability mechanisms among MPs, 
nor could their deviation from instructions be sanctioned. However, from time to time a 
committee competent on the subject-matter, or the plenary as a whole, expresses a certain 
stance on an issue to be discussed later on within an inter-parliamentary venue. For 
example, plenary votes or votes within the EU or constitutional affairs committees to 
instruct and direct the activity of national parliamentary delegations took place at the time 
of the Conventions on the Charter of fundamental rights and on the future of Europe, and 
in the European, German and Italian parliaments’ committees prior to COSAC’s meetings 
(Fasone 2009: 194-212). 
Even more challenging, from a constitutional point of view, is the case of Speakers 
within the EU Speakers’ Conference. Not only do many of them have a degree of 
autonomy within their parliament that prevents other MPs telling the Speaker what to do, 
but besides this, where Speakers are considered as super partes arbiters under constitutional 
law, they cannot take a political stance abroad, i.e. voting within the EU Speakers’ 
Conference, that would result in a binding decision at the national level. In fact, the 
conclusions prepared by the Presidency of the Conference following the meeting are solely 
aimed at the disclosure of the content of the debates; they are by no means binding on 
individual parliaments (Article 5 of the Guidelines).XI Moreover, taking into account the 
fact that many Speakers do not cast votes in their own parliament, any decision in the 
Conference (for example, declarations) is adopted by consensus (Article 1(4) of the 
Guidelines).XII 
Interestingly, and consistently with the sui generis status of the Speakers and the 
European Parliament’s President compared to ordinary MPs and MEPs as discussed above, 
the EU Speakers’ Conference is devoid of ‘standing orders’ or ‘rules of procedure’. It is, 
more exactly, based on very generic ‘Guidelines’, equally passed and amended by 
consensus, that only provide guidance for the Conference organisation and procedure so as 
not to legally constrain their members (Esposito 2014: 157-159).  
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All these features of the Conference, that are dependent on the special status of the 
Speakers, i.e. lack of binding determinations, of standing orders and of decision-making 
rules going beyond consensus, amount to a brake on further development of inter-
parliamentary cooperation among the Speakers. In particular, they do not allow the 
politicisation of the debate in the Conference and, hence, do not help to fill the gap of the 
democratic disconnect between the national and the European levels of government and 
the citizens (Bellamy and Kröger 2016: 125-130 drawing on Lindseth’s theory of 
democratic disconnect, see Lindseth 2010: 31). The remarkable differences between the 
Speakers and the President participating in the EU Speakers’ Conference, in terms of their 
functions and autonomy in their own domestic sphere, also limit the Conference’s leading 
role in inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU and its ability to influence inter-
institutional relations in the EU’s system of government. Although the Conference might 
seem to be the perfect candidate to undertake this role, being composed of the highest 
authority in each parliament of the EU, the constitutional variation between the Speakers’ 
institutional positions, coupled with the lack of decision-making powers outside their 
parliament, constitute a brake on the Conference’s proper performance of this task.  
Despite these problematic features of the Conference, however, there are also several 
elements that give it considerable influence both on the individual legislatures and on inter-
parliamentary cooperation in general, as shown in section 4. Indeed, it cannot be neglected 
that if, on the one hand, domestic rules on the speakership condition the functioning of the 
Conference; on the other hand, this Conference, with its debates and documents 
(conclusions and declarations) adopted, affects the status a Speaker is accorded in her 
jurisdiction by making her inevitably less super partes and more political, even in the case of 
the Speaker of the UK House Commons.XIII So that a sort of two-way influence, between 
the style of speakership and activities of the EU Speakers’ Conference, can start to be 
detected. National rules and practices concerning the role of Speakers affect the way in 
which the Conference performs its role; at the same time, however, participation in the 
Conference has contributed to reshaping the nature and place of Speakers at the domestic 
level. Indeed, the Conference is also an important vehicle of socialisation among Speakers 
about their activity at the domestic level and engenders a sort of mimesis of their role, 
looking for best practices and, most of all, for strengthening individual positions. The 
reinforcement of the Speakers’ political position in their own country as a result of 
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Conference membership is triggered by the fact that in this venue they are the only 
‘representatives’ of their parliament or chamber and they enjoy a considerable autonomy 
on the supranational stage, which in turn leads to their more visible politicisation 
nationally. 
Moreover, as briefly mentioned above, members of this Conference stand at the apex 
of the hierarchical structure of their parliament or chamber and this feature provides the 
EU Speakers’ Conference with an institutional legitimation than all other inter-
parliamentary venues probably lack. Indeed, national Speakers and Presidents lead 
parliamentary administrations and procedures and, thus, there is no higher authority 
beyond them in their own institutions and, likewise, in the development of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. 
A third strength of the EU Speakers’ Conference is its relatively homogeneous 
composition. Indeed, Speakers and Presidents of parliaments, with few exceptions linked 
to changes of the party system and of electoral legislation, are typically well-experienced 
politicians, with a notable cursus honorum and political influence on party members and often 
with an international standing or, at least, with some knowledge of EU institutions and of 
the dynamic in foreign affairs. This implies that, although the legal constraints to which 
they are subject are different, as highlighted above, the political profile of Speakers are 
similar across EU Member States, thereby favouring the consolidation of a close and 
cohesive community of politicians with comparable interests and background. 
Finally, a fourth strength of the Conference is its small size: in a comparative 
perspective, no other inter-parliamentary conference or venue in the EU is composed of 
just 42 members, i.e. the Speakers of the 15 unicameral and 13 bicameral parliaments in the 
EU plus the President of the European Parliament, unless it gathers together the 
representatives of some national legislatures only (Fromage 2016). The limited dimension 
of the EU Speakers’ Conference, and thanks to the crucial support of the parliamentary 
Secretaries Generals meeting every year before the Speakers’ Conference, allows it to work 
much more productively, focussing on the points on the agenda so as to reach a common 
conclusion, than the plethoric sectoral inter-parliamentary conferences of over one 
hundred MPs recently established. 
To conclude on the assessment of the strengths of the Speakers’ Conference, along 
with the significance of its peculiar memberships, the relatively homogeneous composition 
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and small size of the Conference are further elements that have made this body work 
relatively effectively compared to plethoric forums like the Interparliamentary Conference 
on CFSP and CDSP and the Conference on stability, economic coordination and 
governance. 
 
4. The ‘quasi-constitutional’, though controversial, role of  the EU 
Speakers’ Conference 
 
The ‘quasi-constitutional role’ taken up by the EU Speakers Conference in ruling the 
(dis)order of inter-parliamentary cooperation (Cooper 2017: 236), has, for some time at 
least, been driven by, among other things, the persistent disagreement between the 
European Parliament and national parliaments and amongst national parliaments on the 
design, organisation, scope of action and powers of the Interparliamentary Conference of 
CFSP and CDSP (Raube and Fonk 2018, in this Special Issue) and of the Conference on 
Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance of the EU (Kreilinger 2018, in this 
Special Issue). The clearest way through which the leadership of the EU Speakers’ 
Conference on inter-parliamentary cooperation has manifested itself is by means of the 
influence exerted on the rules of procedure of new inter-parliamentary conferences. 
 In the case of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP-CDSP, the new body was 
set up following decisions taken at the EU Speakers’ Conference in Brussels, 4–5 April 
2011, and in Warsaw, on 20–21 April 2012. In the meeting of 2011 the Speakers had 
diverging views on some aspects of the new conference, like the size of the delegations, but 
did establish principles regarding, for example, the frequency of the conference’s meetings, 
its decision-making rules, the Presidency, and the role of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Those principles were defined in the conclusions of 
the EU Speakers’ Conference’s Presidency as rules by which the new Interparliamentary 
Conference had to abide in adopting the rules of procedure and working methods. One 
year later, and as the Interparliamentary Conference for CFSP-CDSP had yet to hold its 
first meeting (which eventually took place in Nicosia in September 2012), the EU Speakers’ 
Conference convened in Warsaw and supplemented those principles, by eventually 
defining the composition of the delegations and the arrangements for the secretariat. 
Furthermore, the Speakers’ Conference recommended that the future CFSP-CDSP 
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Conference carry out a review of those principles and rules subsequently adopted, after two 
years, and to submit the results of such review (again) to the Speakers. The first meeting of 
the new inter-parliamentary conference, held a few months later, strictly followed the 
principles set out by the Speakers’ Conference and entrenched two provisions in the rules 
of procedure that enhanced the rule-making authority of the Speakers. Article 8(2) affirmed 
that any amendment to those rules ‘must be in accordance with the framework set out by 
the Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments’ and Article 9 assigned to the EU 
Speakers’ Conference the final say over the recommendations adopted within 18 months 
by the ad hoc review committee on the rules of procedure. 
When the review took place, however, the final decision on updating and amending the 
rules of procedure was taken by the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP-CDSP itself, 
at its meeting in Rome on 6–7 November 2014; a decision that was later on also endorsed 
by the EU Speakers’ Conference in Rome, on 20–21 April 2015. 
The fact that the new inter-parliamentary conference regained jurisdiction over its own 
rule-making demonstrates that this body enjoys autonomy and is able to make the choices 
that are more consistent with the features of the peculiar field in which it is called upon to 
operate and that it aims to scrutinise. The EU Speakers’ Conference can help to coordinate 
the activity of the Interparliamentary Conference on CFSP-CDSP with the remaining inter-
parliamentary activities of the Union,XIV but, from a normative point of view, it may not be 
appropriate that the Speakers ‘usurp’ members of the sectoral conference by ruling on its 
organisation and functioning years after its initial establishment. 
The setting up of the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance in the EU has proved to be even more controversial.XV Its 
first meeting took place in Vilnius in October 2013 and since then the Conference has been 
unable to adopt its rules of procedure, causing a series of spillover effects on the 
performance of this body, lacking any basic standards for its operation. Because of the 
gridlock, the EU Speakers’ Conference stepped in to try to address the problem of the 
delay in the adoption of the rules of procedure.XVI The Italian Parliament, holding the 
Presidency in the second half of 2014, proposed its own draft rules at the 
Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in 
the EU of October 2014, and, following the amendments submitted by other legislatures, 
prepared a compromise text in December 2014. At the EU Speakers’ Conference in April 
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2015 the revised draft rules were expected to be finally adopted, since they could count on 
the support of the European Parliament, the French and the German Parliaments, among 
others. However, other parliaments – for instance, the UK, Polish and the Dutch – stood 
against the approval of the new conference’s rules of procedure by the EU Speakers’ 
Conference, which would have required the consensus of all the Speakers. They objected 
that the Speakers’ Conference would have acted beyond its mandate, if it had adopted the 
rules of another conference. The debate on whether to defer the decision to the next 
Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in 
the EU entailed a reflection on the right balance to strike between the rule-making function 
of the Speakers’ Conference and the sectoral inter-parliamentary conferences’ autonomy; in 
the end the latter prevailed. In line with the conclusions of the Speakers reached in 2011 
and 2012 on the Interparliamentary Conference for CFSP and CDSP, the Speakers’ 
Conference in Rome only agreed on a set of principles to ‘be transposed in detailed Rules 
of procedure by the next Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance in the EU’, as in fact happened in Luxembourg on 9-10 
November 2015.XVII The Speakers addressed issues such as the participating parliaments 
(from all the Member States and not just the contracting parties of the Fiscal Compact), the 
focus of the Conference, the timing and the linguistic regimes, but they did not touch upon 
the most debated questions of the size of the delegations and the relationship between the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments in the new forum. 
The fact that the EU Speakers’ Conference is now managing with care its rule-making 
powers vis-à-vis other inter-parliamentary venues was confirmed by the Conclusions of the 
Conference of 22-24 May 2016 in LuxembourgXVIII and of the Conference of 23-25 April 
2017 in Bratislava as pertaining to the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol – 
JPSG (Annex I to the general Conclusions).XIX In fact, there were no other alternative legal 
options. The Europol JPSG is already regulated in part by EU legislation, Regulation 
2016/794 of 11 May 2016 concerning the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (Europol), so the EU Speakers’ Conference could not alter its mandate and 
powers, in particular its prospective nature of a scrutiny and monitoring body as well as the 
chosen format, initially in opposition to the Conference model. The Speakers’ Conference’s 
recommendation was that the constituent meeting for the Europol JPSG be held as soon 
as possible (which indeed happened on 9-10 October 2017). As far as the adoption of rules 
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of procedure is concerned, the Speakers’ Conference gave some guidelines for its setting 
up: for example, on the maximum size of a national delegation (4 members), with up to 
two members per Chamber in case of bicameral legislatures, and the size of the European 
Parliament’s delegation (up to 16 members); the joint presidency; and the frequency of the 
meetings, at least twice a year.  
In light of the amendments proposed, in particular by the French and German 
Parliaments, to establish an ad hoc secretariat, create the Troika presidency and enhance 
the scrutiny powers of the Group, the JPSC, in its meeting in Sofia on 18-19 March 2018 
adopted, first of all in compliance with the EU Regulation, its detailed rules of procedure.XX 
According to Article 6.2, these rules will be subject to review after two years, in line with 
the recommendations of the EU Speakers’ Conference of Bratislava in 2017, and the 
Presidency of the EU Speakers Conference will be informed about the outcome of the 
review. Indeed, in the rules of procedure the Conclusions of the 2017 EU Speakers’ 
Conference of Bratislava are regarded as a point of reference and as a standard with which 
to comply, although it does not appear that, despite high expectations (Griglio 2016; 
Kreilinger 2017), the JPSG will be shaped in a radically different manner compared to 
sectoral inter-parliamentary conferences (Fromage 2017). Here, the directions provided by 
the EU Speakers’ Conference on the setting up of the JPSG seem to have decisively 
conditioned the future shape of this inter-parliamentary venue in a way that is consistent 
with the standard configuration of the sectoral conferences, the (partial) regulation of 
which the Speakers had already contributed. In other words, and despite the legal 
framework provided by EU Regulation 2016/794 on the JPSG, over the years the EU 
Speakers’ Conference may have triggered a sort of ‘harmonisation’ of the configuration of 
inter-parliamentary forums in the EU, lacking a strong autonomous ability of these forums 
to independently define their structure, composition and activity. 
 
5. The (unsatisfactory) alternatives to the leadership of  the EU 
Speakers’ Conference 
 
Having examined the current state of affairs of the EU Speakers’ Conference and at its 
‘quasi-constitutional’ role in inter-parliamentary cooperation – its limited impact on the 
side of the coordination and of the joint parliamentary scrutiny in the EU, but the 
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significant, though controversial, rule-making and function over the other inter-
parliamentary venues – it appears worth exploring if there are any real alternatives to the 
leadership of this Conference, both from a practical and a normative perspective, i.e. what 
is the appeal of other options. 
First of all, neither the European Parliament nor the Parliament of the Member State 
holding the six-month presidency of the EU can individually play the coordinating role of 
the EU Speakers’ Conference, both from a legal and from a political point of view.XXI 
From a legal point of view, the exclusive leadership of the European Parliament or of a 
national parliament (on a rotating basis) would contravene the prescription of Article 9, 
Protocol 1, which demands the co-determination of inter-parliamentary cooperation by the 
European and national parliaments. From a political point of view, the monopoly of 
coordination of inter-parliamentary cooperation, either by the European Parliament or by a 
national parliament acting autonomously, would be politically unsustainable as national 
parliaments would never accept the exclusive leadership of the European Parliament and 
the European Parliament that of national parliaments. 
Second, the Conference of the Parliamentary committees on EU affairs (COSAC), 
once the best candidate to fit this purpose, in principle, according to Article 10, Protocol 1, 
would then be the main competitor of the EU Speakers’ Conference in taking the lead in 
the coordination of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU; for both conferences are 
generalist inter-parliamentary bodies, i.e. they do not have a sectoral-policy oriented 
specialisation. Indeed, COSAC shall promote the exchange of information and best 
practices between national parliaments and the European Parliament and may organise 
inter-parliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular CFSP and CDSP (Dias 
Pinheiro 2018, in this Special Issue). However, a ‘catch-all policies venue’ like COSAC, 
devoid of the former coordinating function on the early warning mechanism, has suffered 
an identity crisis from which it has not yet been able to recover (Cygan 2016; Van Keulen 
2016). This has come about as a result of the strengthening of the process of European 
integration on many (new) policies, increasing specialisation by policy domain and the need 
to carry out an effective scrutiny especially in areas of shared competence (Article 4 
TFEU), and fields where the EU supports, coordinates and supplements the action of the 
Member States (Articles 5 and 6 TFEU). Therefore, the legal basis for the setting up of 
new inter-parliamentary conferences has been article 9 rather than article 10 of Protocol 1, 
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which has further undermined the authority and prestige COSAC once enjoyed. Indeed, 
article 10 set out the COSAC model of inter-parliamentary cooperation, based on the 
participation of the European Parliament on an equal footing with national parliaments and 
on overcoming the strict enforcement of consensus formation and of the unanimity rule of 
decision-making. However, in contrast, article 9 is a more flexible legal basis only requiring 
national parliaments and the European Parliament to jointly determine the organisation 
and the promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation in the Union. 
The choice of Article 9 for the new conferences therefore strengthens the power of the 
European Parliament, and ultimately undermines COSAC’s design and procedures as a 
model of inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Third, the two sectoral inter-parliamentary conferences already established, given their 
limited scope of action on certain policies, are not placed in the best position to play a 
coordinating role among the many venues and forums of inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
Finally, an interesting proposal put forward recently seems to suggest that perhaps 
there is no need to have a sole and final authority to rule the developments of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. Rather, the ‘order’ of inter-parliamentary cooperation relies on 
the internal rationalisation of the three main stances of cooperation in the EU, namely: the 
two inter-parliamentary conferences and the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group thus far 
set up according to a functional specialisation; the EU Speakers’ Conference; and the 
‘Parliamentary dimension’ of the Council Presidency (Cooper 2017: 243-245). To these 
dimensions a third can be added as a complement: the ‘hidden’ coordinating role of the 
European Parliament. This has emerged in several instances of cooperation, from the 
experience of the European Assizes of 1990 to those of the two Conventions, on the 
Charter of fundamental rights (1999-2000) and on the future of Europe (2002-2003) 
(Pinelli 2016) and, more recently, the organisation of joint committee meetings; however, it 
has not always been well tolerated by national parliaments (Fasone and Lupo 2016: 349-
351). Indeed, the European Parliament alone, as said above, could never monopolise the 
coordination of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the Union, should its mode of election 
and composition remain unaltered. It suffers from the distrust of national parliaments (and 
governments), it is also one of the many subjects of inter-parliamentary cooperation, and is 
a member of the EU Speakers’ Conference, so its potential leadership could trigger a sort 
of ‘conflict of interests’ (should it become, at the same time, a member and the leader of 
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this cooperation). Its further strengthening in this domain would be understood through a 
conception of inter-parliamentary cooperation as dominated by the EU level of 
government and, possibly, inspired by a federalist view on the direction the European 
integration process should take, which does not appear close to reality today. The 
persistent lack of a uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament and concrete 
avenues for further differentiation within the EU (Leruth, Gänzle and Trondal 2017) do 
not reinforce the position of this institution in the complex picture of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation either. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Year on year, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Speakers’ 
Conference has taken up and been able to strengthen its ‘quasi-constitutional’ role in inter-
parliamentary cooperation, a role that aspires to settle a well-ordered and stable 
development of inter-parliamentary activities in the EU. It appears that there is no effective 
alternative to this role sitting with the EU Speakers’ Conference, especially looking at the 
other options at stake, and despite the potentiality of the European Parliament and 
COSAC in particular. 
Playing a ‘quasi-constitutional’ role in inter-parliamentary cooperation, however, as the 
most recent experience of the EU Speakers’ Conference reveals, should not only mean its 
extensive exercise of a rule-making function towards other inter-parliamentary venues, not 
least as not all inter-parliamentary forums are alike. Indeed, the Europol JPSG was 
expected to be established according to a competing model compared to the existing 
conferences – although this has probably not happened in practice – and finds its legal 
basis in a purely EU law source, in contrast, for example, to the Interparliamentary 
Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU. In fact, a 
wide use of the rule-making function by the Speakers’ Conference runs against the very 
nature of this forum, where many of its members enjoy a special constitutional autonomy 
and are forbidden to bind their own parliaments when acting inside the Conference. That 
means that the EU Speakers’ Conference cannot do much more than issue guidelines for 
the adoption of rules of procedures and make them subject to (light) review. 
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The coordinating activity of the EU Speakers’ Conference should, by contrast, be 
strengthened. Coordination was the founding function of this Conference when it was 
established, in a context in which very little inter-parliamentary cooperation was in place. 
Thus, a renewal of the coordinating function of the EU Speakers’ Conference should 
primarily consist of easing the contacts and the relationships between the many EU inter-
parliamentary venues, in terms of timing of meetings, consistency of the respective agendas 
and ex-post supervision of the results. With this regard, a closer collaboration with the other 
main ‘agents’ of inter-parliamentary cooperation in the EU, such as the European 
Parliament and the ‘Parliamentary dimension’ of the Council Presidency, would be 
beneficial for the rational deployment of inter-parliamentary activities in order to avoid 
duplication, overlapping and confusion of tasks and activities. 
Additionally, although for the reasons described above it is not directly involved in the 
exercise of joint parliamentary scrutiny in the EU (Griglio and Lupo 2018), the EU 
Speakers’ Conference can indirectly and positively contribute to its fulfilment. Indeed, the 
closer coordination and collaboration with EU institutions just advocated, with the 
European Parliament, or with instances of cooperation, like the ‘Parliamentary dimension’ 
of the Council Presidency, both key actors in their own domains, of joint parliamentary 
scrutiny, could help to make this function more effective. 
                                                 
 Cristina Fasone is Assistant Professor of Comparative Public Law, Department of Political Science, LUISS 
Guido Carli. This article builds on the author’s chapter Ruling the (Dis-)Order of Interparliamentary Cooperation? 
The EU Speakers’ Conference in Lupo and Fasone, eds (2016). 
I Article 9, Protocol 1, indeed, can be considered as a weak legal basis for the role taken up by this 
Conference. The article refers to the co-determination by the European Parliament and national parliaments 
of the ‘organization and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union’. 
II As described in this paragraph, the ‘role’ refers to the actual operation of the EU Speakers Conference, 
while by ‘function’ it is meant a set of activities and tasks in principle ascribed or conferred to the 
Conference. 
III On parliamentary diplomacy as para-diplomacy outside in the EU context see Stavridis 2017: 368-387. 
IV On the gradual engagement of national parliamentary assemblies with European affairs through the 
Speakers’ Conference, see the Keynote speech given by Elia (1975) and now re-published (2009: 465), 
alongside the editorial note by Cannizzaro (2009: 457). 
V See, for example, Conférence informelle des Présidents des Parlements des États Membres et du Parlement 
Européenne, La situation actuelle de l’Union européenne et les tâches des Parlements nationaux qui en découlent concernant la 
democratization et les reformes institutionelles. Rapport de L Lagendries, 1 December 1998, 11. For an overview of the 
history of the EU Speakers’ Conference and its meetings, see EU Speakers’ Conference, The History of the EU 
Speakers’ Conference, available at: www.ipex.eu. 
VI See the Conclusions of the EU Speakers Conference held in Tallin on 23-24 April 2018, available at 
https://www.parleu2017.ee/sites/default/files/2018-
04/Final%20Conclusions%20Conference%20of%20Speakers%20Tallinn.pdf. 
VII This has been further confirmed by the Conclusions adopted on the occasion of the last meeting of the 
EU Speakers Conference held in Tallin on 23-24 April 2018, cit., under the ‘Preliminary remarks’. 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
103 
                                                                                                                                               
VIII See German Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of the Second Senate of 18 December 2002, 2 BvF 1/02 -
Voting procedures in the Bundesrat, ‘Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) case’, § 120 and the 
commentary by Kommers and Miller 2012: 110-114. 
IX On this point and, in particular, in relation to the EU, see Romaniello (2015) and Baraggia (2016). 
X In the XVIIIth term of the Italian Parliament, started in 2018, the representation of the ruling parties and of 
the opposition by the Speakers of the two Houses has instead been inverted: while the Speaker of the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies, Roberto Fico, is a representative of the Five Stars Movement, part of the ruling 
coalition, the President of the Senate, Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, has been elected as a senator of Forza 
Italia, currently in the opposition. At the moment of the election of the two Speakers, on 24 March 2018, 
however, the political situation was very blurred and the formation of the new government yet to come. 
XI The conclusions are drafted in such a way as to ascribe them to the individual Speakers rather than to the 
Conference as a whole. 
XII The only exception is represented by the decision to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference, 
to be proposed by one of the Speakers and to be seconded by two-thirds majority of the members (Art 3(6) 
of the Guidelines). Under Art 5(2) of the Guidelines, any member of the Conference is entitled to disclose 
their disagreement with the position endorsed by the majority of the Conference and should state clearly that 
that opinion has not been confirmed by the Conference as a whole. An interesting case of ‘dissenting 
opinion’ emerged in the aftermath of the EU Speakers’ Conference held in Rome on 20–21 April 2015. The 
Speaker of the Hungarian National Assembly sent a letter to the Speakers of the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
and Senate contesting the fact that the conclusions of the Conference had been really adopted by consensus, 
according to the Conference’s Guidelines. In particular this Speaker objected to the allegation contained in 
the conclusions addressed against Hungary of the violation of fundamental rights. 
XIII For example, during the current speakership of Hon. John Bercow (2009- ), on which see Torre (2013). 
XIV An actual problem of coordination lies in the fact that while the Presidency of the EU Speakers’ 
Conference is assigned to the parliament of the Member State holding the EU Presidency in the second half 
of the calendar year, the organisation of the new interparliamentary conference, every six months, mirrors the 
rotating Presidency of the EU. 
XV The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union entered into 
force on 1 January 2013. Next to this Treaty, the EU legal basis for the creation of the Conference has been 
acknowledged in Article 9, Protocol 1, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. What triggered discussion was also 
the prospective position of the Parliaments from the non-contracting parties of the Treaty within the 
Conference, namely, the Czech Republic and the UK. See, at length, Kreilinger (2015 and 2018) and Cooper 
(2016). 
XVI After the first meeting, three more meetings of the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance in the EU were organised under the Greek and Italian Presidencies in 2014 
and the Latvian Presidency in 2015 without the rules of procedure being adopted. 
XVII See EU Speakers’ Conference, ‘Conclusions of the Presidency’, Rome, 20–21 April 2015, 5, available at: 
www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/euspeakers/getspeakers.do?id=082dbcc54a393144014a4d75e8690dec. See also 
the Rules of procedure of the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance in the European Union available at: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/conference/getconference.do?type=082dbcc5420d8f480142510d09574e02. Interestingly Article 7(2) 
of the Rules of procedure of this Conference mirrors Article 8(2) of the Interparliamentary Conference for 
CFSP and CDSP’s Rules of Procedure, since, as strongly requested by the European Parliament at the 
meeting in Luxembourg in November 2015, it provides that any amendments to these new Rules ‘must be in 
accordance with the framework set by’ the EU Speakers’ Conference. 
XVIII The Conclusions are available here: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/conference/getconference.do?id=082dbcc54d8d4eaf014d9095cb270339 
XIX The Conclusions and their Annex I are available here: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-
WEB/conference/getconference.do?id=082dbcc55898c90b01589abbb37500fa 
XX The Rules of procedures of the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol are available here: 
https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/file/RoP%20adopted%20Sofia%20JPSG_190
32018.pdf  
XXI Despite the growing number of interparliamentary meetings promoted in the framework of the 
‘parliamentary dimension’ of the Council Presidency: see Cooper (2017: 243-245). 
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